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Introduction
The volatility and contagion characteristic of international financial markets, which have dominated emerging economies during the 1990s, have long historical roots.
1 Indeed, from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, Latin America and other regions in the developing world experienced a long boom-bust cycle, the most severe of its kind since that of the 1920s and 1930s. The shortening but also the intensity of boom-bust cycles have been distinctive features of the recent decade. The latter is reflected, in the words of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, in the fact that the "size of the breakdowns and required official finance to counter them is of a different order of magnitude than in the past". 2 Viewed from the perspective of developing countries, the essential feature of instability is the succession of periods of intense capital inflows, in which financial risks significantly increase, facilitated and sometimes enhanced by pro-cyclical domestic macroeconomic policies, and the latter phase of adjustment, in which not only are these risks are exposed but also the pro-cyclical character of the measures adopted to "restore confidence" amplify the flow (economic activity) and stock (portfolio) effects of adjustment processes. An essential part of the solutions to these problems lies in strengthening the institutional framework to prevent and manage financial crises at the global level.
3 This paper looks, however, at the role of developing countries' domestic policies in managing the pro-cyclical effects of externally generated boom-bust cycles. It draws
I. International macroeconomic and financial asymmetries
The dynamics of boom-bust cycles is deeply rooted in the operation of financial markets, a point that has been extensively recognized in the literature, but also in some basic asymmetries which characterize the world economy. These asymmetries have largely (though not exclusively) center-periphery dimensions. The first of them is basically macroeconomic. Put succinctly, whereas the center economies -particularly the largest economies among them-are "business cycle makers", the developing countries (the "periphery", in this simple framework) are "business cycle takers". This reflects the fact that, broadly speaking, the center generates the global shocks (in terms of economic activity, financial flows, commodity prices and the instability of the exchange rate of major currencies), to which developing countries respond.
This asymmetry is closely associated to the fact that the center economies' national currencies (now regional in the case of most members of the European Union) are also international currencies. This gives them some degrees of freedom in terms of the use of national monetary policies to manage domestic business cycles, although certainly at the possible cost of exchange rate fluctuations in the current world of floating exchange rates among major currencies; the degrees of freedom are obviously greater for the country that has the major international currency (the United States) and more limited for the rest of the industrialized economies. Through the effects of monetary policies on economic activity and the exchange rates, the center economies generate externalities to the rest of the world that are not internalized by policy makers. These externalities are strongly felt in the developing world, which must adjust to them but lack the degrees of freedom that the ability to supply international currencies provides. Again, putting it succinctly, whereas the center is made of "policy making" economies (again, with variations among them), the periphery is largely "policy taking". Indeed, developing countries are expected to behave in ways that generate "credibility" to financial markets, which implies, in particular, that they are expected to adopt pro-cyclical (austerity) policies during crises. This generates, in turn, economic and political economy pressures to also adopt pro-cyclical policies during booms. Non-financial agents and financial intermediaries resist restrictions which authorities may impose on their ability to spend or lend during booms, whereas authorities are only happy to have some breathing space after a period of austerity. Expressed in another way, not only are the incentives to adjust absent during booms, but the drastic application of austerity rules during crises distorts the incentives which economic agents and authorities face throughout the business cycle (why should you also adjust during booms?).
Viewed in historical terms, whereas the move away from the gold standard since the 1930s freed international-currency-issuing countries from adhering to the "rules of the game", adherence to those rules continued to be to a large extent a major feature of the periphery. "Depression economics", as one author has recently called it, 6 has been present all along in the noninternational-currency-issuing countries. Its effects during crises have certainly been more sanguine in the last quarter of the twentieth century, due to the coincidence of slower growth at the center and larger but volatile international capital flows. The latter lifted, indeed, constraints on spending during booms, but only to make them more intense during the subsequent bust. Although access to multilateral financing in the post-war period may have helped to smooth out adjustment during crises, the counterpart of such financing has been, in any case, strict adherence to the "rules of the game".
The sharp distinction between "business cycle/policy takers" and "business cycle/policy makers" certainly goes a long way to summarize major features of the international economy today. However, it should be qualified in three important ways. First of all, to the extent that there are domestic policy alternatives, developing countries are not entirely "policy takers". This paper is precisely focused on such anti-cyclical policy alternatives. This does not eliminate, however, the basic assertion that current incentives in the world order push them in the opposite direction, towards pro-cyclical policies. Moreover, if authorities do indeed adopt such pro-cyclical policies, they help to amplify the world business cycles, and to that extent they are "business cycle makers". Finally, different developing countries have different degrees of access to international financial safety nets, depending on private assessments of creditworthiness (subject to error), international political and/or economic clout, and the corresponding access to private or official financing. This implies that those who have a more limited access (the poorest and the smallest countries) may face a disproportionate need for pro-cyclical domestic policy response to external shocks.
The basic macroeconomic asymmetries between "business cycle/policy makers" and "business cycle/policy takers" have as counterparts basic asymmetries in financial markets. Four must be singled out: (a) between the size of developing countries' domestic financial markets and the size of the speculative pressures they may face; 7 (b) the nature of the currencies in which external debt is denominated, which generates significant currency mismatches between assets and liabilities; (c) significant difference in the maturities supplied by domestic and international financial institutions, which implies that there would be significant maturity mismatches for debtors unable to access international markets (e.g., small and medium-size firms) and currency mismatches for those that can; and (d) the thinness of domestic financial (particularly security) 6 Krugman (1999). 7 See, on this, the very interesting remarks of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force (1999), ch. III. markets, which reduces the liquidity of financial instruments. Viewed as a whole, this implies that domestic financial markets in the developing world are significantly more "incomplete" that international financial markets, indicating that some financial intermediation must necessarily be done through international markets. It also implies that integration into international financial markets is integration between unequal partners.
8
The associated risks can only be partly covered (e.g., currency risks of large non-financial intermediaries 9 ) or partly corrected by domestic policy actions. Indeed, some of the policy actions that emerging economies can adopt to prevent risks merely reflect (or reproduce) rather than correct the basic asymmetries in financial systems. For example, domestic financial risks in the developing world have a large macroeconomic component, particularly those associated to fluctuations of exchange and interest rates. This could be managed by adopting stronger prudential regulations of domestic financial activities than minimum international (Basle) standards (see Section V below). However, this raises the costs of financial intermediation and probably restricts the development of new financial services, thus shifting financial asymmetries to another level, indeed increasing the incentives to use international financial intermediation. The same can be said of moving to a currency board regime or giving up the national currency altogether. While these moves certainly reduce or eliminate currency risks, they may merely shift the underlying risks to other areas. Particularly, they could make economic activity more volatile, given the additional restrictions on the adoption of anti-cyclical policies. We will return to this in Section III below. In a very deep sense, developing countries face country rather than currency risks; the latter are, in a sense, a mere manifestation of the former, which under certain conditions can generate additional difficulties (an overvalued exchange rate in an adjustable peg system, or outright monetary and financial mismanagement). 8 CEPAL/ ECLAC (2000a, ch. 8); Studart (1996 ). Hausemann's (2000 concept of "original sin" captures the second and third of these asymmetries.
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The coverage should be provided by private financial agents, and it is likely to be limited. The government or the central bank can also provide some of the coverage, and indeed may help to develop a market for such risk-management instruments. However, they could merely "socialize" the macroeconomic risks involved, potentially increasing the corresponding fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs (see Section VI below).
II. The macroeconomics of boombust cycles
The association between capital flows -and, more particularly, the net resource transfer-and economic growth has been a strong feature of Latin America in the 1990s (and, for that matter, of the past quarter century), as the panel A in Figure 1 indicates. This fact highlights the central role played by the mechanisms by which externally-generated boom-bust cycles are transmitted in the "business cycle/policy taking" countries.
These mechanisms are well known. The boom encourages an increase in public and private spending, which will inevitably lead to an adjustment whose severity will bear a direct relationship to how excessive spending levels were, as reflected in accumulated liabilities, and to the degree of mistrust generated among market agents. Thus, temporary public sector revenues and readily accessible external credit during booms generate an expansion of public sector spending, which will be followed by a severe adjustment later on, when those conditions are no longer present. A private lending cycle is generated by shifts in the availability of external financing and the cyclical patterns of international interest rates and spreads; availability and spreads are associated, in turn, to significant asymmetries in risk evaluation during booms and crises. Private-sector debt overhangs accumulated during the boom will subsequently trigger a sharp contraction in lending, usually accompanied by deterioration in bank portfolios. 
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL VOLATILITY AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Poor prudential regulation and supervision of financial systems, and a lack of experience of financial agents in evaluating risks will lead to a significant underestimation of risks, reinforcing the credit expansion during the boom. Both conditions are characteristics of periods of rapid financial liberalization. Nevertheless, even well regulated systems are subject to periodic episodes of euphoria, when risks are underestimated, as the experience of many industrialized countries indicates. Private-sector borrowing and spending sprees spur sharp upswings in the prices of certain assets (particularly financial instruments and real estate). This produces a wealth effect that in turn accentuates the boom in spending, but the reverse will hold when spending, borrowing and, consequently, asset prices fall. This process is reinforced by the greater liquidity that characterize fixed assets during periods of financial euphoria -i.e., the fact that buyers are more readily 
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Billions of dollars available and thus financial decisions are more easily reversible without incurring in substantial losses-and, on the contrary, their reduced liquidity during crises. The use of assets as collateral will facilitate the boom in private spending and borrowing, but it will then increase the vulnerability of the financial system during the subsequent downswing, when it becomes clear that the loans did not have enough backing. Asset prices will then plunge even further as debtors strive to cover their financial obligations and creditors seek to liquidate the assets received in payment for outstanding debts.
Capital account booms -as well as high export prices-will also induce an exchange rate appreciation, and strong pressures on exchange rate and interest rates during the ensuing busts. Exchange rate fluctuations have, in turn, significant wealth effects in countries with large net external liabilities. The capital gains generated by appreciation during booms further fuels the spending boom, whereas the capital losses generated by depreciation have the opposite effect and may weaken domestic financial intermediaries. This is true even if prudential regulations forbid them from holding currency mismatches in their portfolio, as the capital losses incurred by nonfinancial firms with mixed external and domestic liabilities transforms the currency risks of the former into domestic financial risks. Thus, the wealth effects of exchange rate variations are certainly pro-cyclical in debtor countries. The income effects may have similar signs, at least in the short run, as the extensive literature on the contractionary effects of devaluation indicates.
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The associated macroeconomic volatility is costly in both economic and social terms. In economic terms, it increases uncertainty, reduces the efficiency of fixed capital investment and leads economic agents to prefer "defensive" microeconomic strategies that avoid committing fixed capital in the production process. For all of these reasons, it discourages investment. The higher risk levels faced by domestic financial system biases lending to shorter maturities, reducing its ability to intermediate the savings-investment process and generating a lending structure that increases risks (see Section IV). If severe enough, the domestic financial crisis will generate losses that amount to the equivalent of large proportions of GDP. Exchange rate appreciation during booms may generate, in turn, "Dutch disease" effects on tradable sectors, which become permanent if significant learning processes are present.
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In social terms, there is growing evidence in Latin America of ratchet effects of employment and poverty (and probably income distribution) through the business cycle. 12 This is associated to permanent losses in human capital during crises: children who leave school and never return, workers who lose labor experience and connections as a result of un-or underemployment, smallsized firms that lose their assets and goodwill, etc. The recovery that follows may benefit other persons and firms than those who experienced difficulties during the crisis, thus generating permanent losses for the latter. There may also be ratchet effects on the quality of public sector services as the result of cycles in spending. Thus, for example, the loss of human capital and morale and growing disorganization of services during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s was not entirely reversed by recovery in the 1990s.
The most important policy implication of the high costs of externally-generated boom-bust cycles is that the developing country authorities need to focus their attention on crisis prevention, i.e., on managing booms, since in most cases crises are the inevitable result of poorly managed 10 See, in particular, Cooper (1971) , Díaz-Alejandro (1988, ch. 1) and Krugman and Taylor (1978) for classic analyses of this topic.
This is a characteristic of "Dutch disease" effects in their dynamic version. See Krugman (1990, ch. 7) and van Wijnbergen (1984) . 12 The aggregate unemployment rate of Latin America (and of several individual countries) shows such a pattern: a sharp increase during the "Tequila" crisis that had not been entirely reversed when the Asian crises hit and increased it again. The evolution of poverty in the region over the past two decades shows the same pattern: an increase in the 1980s that was not entirely reversed in the 1990s, despite the fact that by the end of decade per-capita GDP was above the 1980 level. The patterns of poverty in Argentina and Mexico through crisis and recovery show a similar performance, as reflected in the fact that by 1997 and 1998 poverty was not back to 1994 levels. See CEPAL/ECLAC (2000a, ch. 8; 2000b, ch. 1) and Lustig (1999). booms. Concentration of attention in crisis prevention recognizes, moreover, an obvious fact: that the degrees of freedom of the authorities may be greater during booms than during crises. The way crises are managed is not irrelevant, however. In particular, different policy mixes may have quite different effects on economic activity and employment, on the one hand, and on the domestic financial system, on the other.
The following sections of this paper argue for a mix based on four different sets of policies: (a) managed exchange rate flexibility cum capital account regulations to provide room for anticyclical monetary and financial policies; (b) strong "liability policies" to improve the debt profiles of the countries (which include but go beyond capital account regulations); (c) an anti-cyclical management of prudential regulation and supervision of domestic financial systems; and (d) fiscal stabilization. All policies have limited effects, given the reduced degrees of freedom that authorities face and the reduced effectiveness of some instruments in globalized markets. Thus, policy mixes in which these different elements support each other in their anti-cyclical task are called for. The specific emphasis will vary depending on the macroeconomic constraints and traditions of each particular country.
III. The exchange rate regime
In today's open developing economies, the exchange rate regime is subject to two conflicting demands, which are not easily reconcilable. These conflicts are closely associated to the more limited degrees of freedom that authorities face in a world of limited policy instruments and reduced policy effectiveness.
The first is a demand for stability. It comes from trade, but also from the capital account and from domestic price stability. With the dismantling of traditional trade policies, the real exchange rate has become a key determinant of international competitiveness.
13 Given the central role that exports play in the growth process, competitive real exchange rates are essential for sustained economic growth. Indeed, the structural deterioration in the growth/trade balance tradeoff which Latin America experienced in the 1990s with respect to the three decades prior to the debt crisis (see Figure 2 ) may be explained by the combination of trade liberalization and the fairly broad real exchange rate appreciation trend which the region experienced during the past decade ( Figure 1 ). 14 13
We will not deal here, however, with the literature on the long-run determinants of the real exchange rate. It suffices for our purposes that nominal exchange rates be relevant in the evolution of real exchange rates through the business cycle. This characteristic is clearly born out by the experience of Latin America in the 1990s. Thus, in particular, nominal appreciation pressures (relative to national inflation levels) were strong during the capital booms pre-and post-"Tequila", and were reflected in strong real appreciation; during the Asian crisis, nominal devaluations had very limited inflationary effects and, thus, strong real effects; and the Mexican devaluation of 1994-1995 had also strong real effect, though it was also inflationary. A way of posing these issues is that access and conditions of external financing are one of the determinants of the real exchange rate, alongside others (the terms of trade, the fiscal stance, relative productivity trends in tradables vs. non-tradables, etc.), but that the magnitude of external financing/real exchange rate link is not independent of the exchange rate regime. 
TRADE BALANCE AND GDP GROWTH
From the point of view of the capital account, a "hard peg" is seen as a useful instrument to avoid the pro-cyclical wealth effects of exchange rate fluctuations in countries with significant liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. 15 Finally, from the point of view of macroeconomic policy, it is associated to the need to anchor the price level as part of anti-inflationary programs or, more generally, to guarantee price stability, in small open economies. It should be emphasized that these two demands for stability may be inconsistent with that which comes from trade. Thus, an anti-inflationary program or hard pegs lead many times to overvalued exchange rates that run counter to the objective of international competitiveness.
The second is a demand for flexibility. It also comes from both the trade and the capital account. On the trade side, exchange rate flexibility has been traditionally seen as a useful instrument to accelerate real exchange rate adjustments in the face of external shocks (terms of trade changes, exchange rate adjustments or growth trade of major trading partners, etc.). Also, boom-bust cycles in international capital markets generate a demand for flexible macroeconomic variables to absorb, in the short run, the positive and negative shocks they generate. Given the reduced effectiveness of some traditional policy instruments in open economies -particularly monetary policy-, the exchange rate plays an essential role in helping to absorb such shocks. This demand for flexibility explains the fairly broad trends towards greater exchange rate flexibility that characterizes the world economy since the breakdown of the dollar standard in the early 1970s. The Argentinean and Ecuadorean cases aside, this has also been the trend in Latin America in the 1990s and was particularly noticeable during the recent Asian crisis. 15 See, for example, Hausmann (2000) and Calvo (2000) . 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-1998
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The relevance of these conflicting demands is not captured in the call by many analysts to adopt either of the two polar exchange rate regimes, either a totally flexible exchange rate or a currency board (or outright dollarization). Indeed, the case for polar regimes is a call to recognize that policy autonomy is quite limited in today's world and, thus, that any attempt to manage the conflicting demands on exchange rate policy should be given up. The "revealed preference" of authorities in the developing world is, on the contrary, to choose intermediate regimes of managed exchange rate flexibility (such as crawling pegs and bands, and dirty flotation), in an attempt to reconcile these conflicting demands.
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Currency boards certainly introduce built-in institutional arrangements that provide for fiscal and monetary discipline, but they reduce and, in the limit, eliminate the room for stabilizing monetary and credit policies -both of them necessary to prevent crises and to facilitate recovery in a post-crisis environment. It thus tends to generate stronger swings in economic activity and asset prices. In other words, the fiscal and monetary discipline characteristic of this exchange rate regime enhances the pro-cyclical features of "business cycle/policy taking" economies. Probably as a result of this, these arrangements are not speculation-proof, as the experience of Argentina in 1994-1995, Hong Kong in 1997 and, for that matter, of the gold standard in the periphery indicates.
17 More generally, they are not free from pro-cyclical, externally-induced pressure on interest rates. In this regime, adjustment to cyclical or structural overvaluation (if the economy gets "locked" in an overvalued exchange rate during the transition, or as a result of effective devaluation by major trade partners, or the appreciation of the currency to which the exchange rate is tied) is painful, as it relies on open deflation to operate. This process is very slow, as the experience of Argentina during the Asian crisis indicates. Structural overvaluation in a currency board regime may thus become a bet to low structural rates of growth (mixed with strong business cycles).
On the other hand, the volatility characteristic of freely floating exchange rate regimes increases the costs of trade transactions, thus reducing the benefits of international specialization, and may be subject to adverse "Dutch disease" effects during booms. Moreover, they run the risk of merely becoming a different way of transmitting boom-bust cycles, through the pro-cyclical wealth and (possibly) income effects of exchange rate variations outlined in the previous section. Flexibility certainly deters some short-term flows -particularly portfolio flows and short-term debt-, but it is unlikely to smooth out the medium-term capital account cycle. Rather, it could enhance it, as the significant capital gains and losses associated to real exchange rate cycles may further encourage "self-fulfilling" booms and busts.
Moreover, anti-cyclical monetary or credit policies under freely floating exchange rate regimes with open capital accounts enhance cyclical exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, the key problem faced by the authorities during booms in economies with open capital accounts is that the capital market exerts downward pressure on interest rates, appreciation pressure on the exchange rate, or a combination of the two. In these cases, any attempt by policy-makers to counteract the upward trend in private and public spending by using contractionary monetary policies will only fuel the trend towards exchange rate appreciation. During crises, markets push for a mix of devaluation and interest rate hikes. Any attempt to avoid the latter by expansionary monetary policy will encourage stronger devaluation. Thus, if authorities consider that the exchange rate fluctuations generated by boom-bust cycles are too strong to start with, they may be encouraged to use monetary policy to smooth out such fluctuations. Thus, the "monetary autonomy" features of 16 For recent defenses of intermediate regimes, see CEPAL/ECLAC (2000a), ch. 8, Frankel (1999) and Williamson (2000) . For an interesting review of the recent controversy on exchange rate regimes, see Velasco (2000) . 17 In the gold standard era, prices were more flexible, but price flexibility tended to generate additional domestic financial risks during crises (due to the rapid increase in real debts generated by deflation, which may be thought as equivalent today to very high real interest rates during the crisis). It also generated a strong short-term bias in domestic lending, associated to the need to reduce nominal portfolios rapidly during periods of contraction of monetary aggregates. free floating, in the traditional sense of the term -i.e., the ability to adopt monetary policies on the basis of domestic factors alone-, may not materialize.
The ability of a flexible exchange rate regime to smooth out the effects of externallygenerated boom-bust cycles thus depends on the capacity to effectively manage an anti-cyclical monetary and credit policy without enhancing pro-cyclical exchange rate patterns. This is only possible in managed exchange rate regimes cum capital account regulation. It is only in this case that we can speak of effective, though certainly limited, "monetary autonomy". During periods of euphoria, this means that macroeconomic policies must focus on mitigating upward pressures on private and public sector spending through contractionary monetary (classical open market operations, sterilized accumulation of international reserves, and higher reserve or liquidity requirements) or credit (caps on credit growth) policies, supported by capital account regulations that restrict the additional capital inflows induced by upward pressures on domestic interest rates. During crises, it means that the ability to effectively use monetary policy as an expansionary policy tool without generating excessive devaluation may require effective regulations to avoid capital outflows. To avoid credibility issues and guarantee effectiveness, the basic mechanisms of capital account regulation should be in place throughout the business cycle, and should be tightened or loosened depending on the phase of the cycle (see Section IV below).
Other features may support the choice of intermediate regimes, particularly in the smaller developing countries. First of all, the "law of one price" does not hold even in fairly small economies, as reflected in the fact that real exchange rate variability is only weakly dependent on the size of the economies, despite the greater relative weight of foreign trade in the smaller economies.
18 Secondly, the strong dependence of these economies on foreign trade makes profitability in a broader range of economic activities dependent on the real exchange rate. Thirdly, the stronger dependence of public-sector finances in these economies on external factors limits the room for anti-cyclical fiscal policies. Finally, the thinness of exchange rate markets make them subject to stronger volatility under free floating, and the thinness of domestic capital markets limits the chances for sterilized monetary operations. Thus, some exchange rate flexibility is useful (first feature) and may be a necessary anti-cyclical instrument (second and third features), but the thinness of markets eliminates the usefulness of free floating (fourth feature).
Although intermediate regimes thus provide the only framework for anti-cyclical policies in "business cycle/policy taking" countries, and thus some degree of "monetary autonomy", their scope is, in any case, limited. First, it depends on the effectiveness of capital account regulations as a macroeconomic policy tool, a point on which we will return below. Second, all intermediate ("dirty") options are subject to speculative pressures if they do not generate credibility in markets, and the costs of defending exchange rate from pressures is very costly in this context. Third, sterilized reserve accumulation during booms is also costly. Although the additional reserves may provide additional "self-insurance" during the ensuing crises, sterilization may generate significant quasi-fiscal losses.
The usefulness of this approach also depends on effective incentives for the authorities to behave in an anti-cyclical fashion. In this regard, the exclusive focus on inflation rate targeting characteristic of most independent central banks, or the incentives that governments face in postinflationary environments, may generate strong "appreciation biases" that lead to asymmetric interventions. In particular, given the expected effects of the exchange rate on the price level, devaluation during crises is resisted more than appreciation during booms. Since both features are certainly characteristic of Latin America, it may explain the longer term trend to stronger currencies which characterized the region in the 1990s, which was only temporarily slowed down by the "Tequila" and Asian crises (see Figure 1, Panel B) . Available Latin American evidence is difficult to evaluate in the light of incomplete evidence on certain regimes (particularly, the absence of sustained clean floats -the closest example being Mexico since the Tequila crisis), frequent regime changes and the aforementioned policy biases. Figures 3 and 4 provide some evidence. Figure 3 indicates that a low degree of real exchange rate volatility has been characteristic of quite different exchange rate histories, including Argentina's currency board but also Costa Rica's crawling peg (cum highly publicallycontrolled domestic financial sector) and Peru's highly managed float. The highest volatility has been characteristic of Brazil, which tried, unsuccessfully, to defend an overvalued exchange rate inherited from the Real Plan. El Salvador, with a virtual peg, and Colombia, which had through most of the decade a system of exchange rate bands, have also experienced high real exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, there is only weak association between real exchange rate volatility and GDP volatility, and only a weak negative association between the first of these variables and GDP growth. Argentina, under the currency board regime, may be thought as an example of lack of exchange rate flexibility generating high GDP volatility (the highest in the region after Venezuela).
Generally speaking, authorities have found it difficult to undertake anti-cyclical monetary policies under all regimes. Broadly speaking, interest rate movements follow the external cycle in all countries: an increase during the Tequila crisis, a reduction during the capital boom that followed, and an increase during the recent international financial crisis (see Figure 4) . The intensity of these cycles varies according to country and through time. Argentina under the currency board has not been immune to upward pressures on interest rates during crises -strong during the "Tequila" and somewhat weaker but repetitive during the recent crisis-and, as indicated, has experienced the strongest business cycle. The highest interest rates have been characteristic, however, of episodes in which the authorities have used contractionary monetary policy to avoid or slowdown devaluation pressures in the foreign exchange market. This is the case of Brazil from late-1997 to early 1999, Chile in the second semester of 1998, Colombia during most of 1998 and part of 1999, Mexico during the Tequila crisis, and Peru during the second semester of 1998 and most of 1999. All these episodes were very costly in terms of economic activity. The parallel movements of exchange and interest rates is striking in some countries, particularly in Mexico and Peru. True episodes of "monetary autonomy", in the sense that we have used this term above, have been rare, but have been more frequent in Chile and Colombia, the two countries that have used more actively capital account regulations as a complement to exchange rate policy. 1992M1 1992M5 1992M9 1993M1 1993M5 1993M9 1994M1 1994M5 1994M9 1995M1 1995M5 1995M9 1996M1 1996M5 1996M9 1997M1 1997M5 1997M9 1998M1 1998M5 1998M9 1999M1 1999M5 1999M9 1992M5 1992M9 1993M1 1993M5 1993M9 1994M1 1994M5 1994M9 1995M1 1995M5 1995M9 1996M1 1996M5 1996M9 1997M1 1997M5 1997M9 1998M1 1998M5 1998M9 1999M1 1999M5 1999M9 992M5  992M9  993M1  993M5  993M9  994M1  994M5  994M9  995M1  995M5  995M9  996M1  996M5  996M9  997M1  997M5  997M9  998M1  998M5  998M9  999M1  999M5 
IV. Liability policies
The accumulation of risks during booms will depend not only on the magnitude of domestic and private debts but also on their maturity structure. Capital-account regulations thus have a dual role, as a macroeconomic policy tool, which provides some room for anticyclical monetary policies, and as a "liability policy", to improve private sector external debt profiles. More direct liability policies should also be adopted to improve public sector debt profiles.
19
Viewed as a macroeconomic policy tool, capital account regulations are aimed at the direct source of the boom-bust cycles: unstable capital flows. If they are successful, they will provide some room to "lean against the wind" during periods of financial euphoria, through the adoption of a contractionary monetary policy and reduced appreciation pressures. If effective, they will also reduce or eliminate the quasi-fiscal costs of sterilized foreign exchange accumulation. During crisis, they may also provide "breathing space" for expansionary monetary policies.
Viewed as a liability policy, capital account regulations recognize the fact that the market generously rewards sound external debt structures.
20 This is because, during times of uncertainty, the market responds to gross, rather than merely net, financing 19 The emphasis on liabilities rather than balance sheets here recognizes the fact that they are the most important element of national balance sheet for short-term macroeconomic purposes, together with liquid assets. 20 An excellent recent treatment of this issue is Rodrik and Velasco (1999). requirements, which means that the rollover of short-term liabilities is not financially neutral. Under these circumstances, a time profile that leans towards longer-term obligations will considerably reduce the level of risk. This indicates that an essential component of economic policy management during booms should be measures to improve maturity structures, of both the private and the public sector, and both external and domestic liabilities.
The greatest innovation in this sphere made during the 1990s was unquestionably the establishment of reserve requirements for foreign-currency liabilities in Chile and Colombia (see Box 1). The advantage of this system is that it creates a non-discretionary price incentive that penalizes short-term foreign-currency liabilities more heavily. The corresponding levy is significantly higher than the level that has been suggested for an international Tobin tax.
21
Box 1
PRICE-BASED CAPITAL ACCOUNT REGULATIONS IN CHILE AND COLOMBIA
21
See Tobin (1978) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1996) .
Under the Chilean system, established in 1991, all loans were subject to a foreigncurrency deposit in the central bank at a flat rate (that reached a peak value of 30%) for a specified period (initially three months, but later lengthened to 12). Under the Colombian system, created in 1993, this deposit requirement applied only to credits with maturities below a specified term (initially 18 months, but this was later lengthened to between three and five years); the amount to be deposited was inversely proportional to the term of the credit. Because of its greater complexity, this system was replaced by a simpler one in 1997 that was similar to the Chilean scheme, the main difference being that the deposit (originally 30% for 18 months) is made in the local currency and is therefore not protected from devaluation.
In both cases, the deposit may be replaced by the payment of a sum to the central bank equivalent to the opportunity cost, which means that it is exactly equivalent to a fixed cost for external borrowing (i.e., a Tobin tax). This levy is quite high, however, far higher than the level that has been suggested for an international Tobin tax: about 3% in the Chilean system for oneyear loans during booms in the capital market; and an average of 13.6% for one-year loans in Colombia during 1994-1998 and 6.4% for three-year loans. The magnitude of the tax also tends to fluctuate endogenously as a function of certain macroeconomic variables (the external interest rate, in the Chilean case; that variable plus the domestic interest rate and devaluation expectations in Colombia). The management of this tax has been countercyclical, as it has been raised during boom years and lowered, indeed to zero rate in both countries, during the recent financial crisis.
In both countries, reserve requirements have been complemented by other regulations on capital flows. In Chile, all investments -including direct and portfolio investments-were subject to a one-year minimum stay requirement up to May 2000, and there are a number of rules regarding minimum sums and ratings for bond and ADR issues on the external market as well. In Colombia there are no restrictions on direct investment, but the operations of portfolio investors in the country and bond or ADR issues made by Colombian firms on foreign markets are subject to the direct control of the Superintendency of Securities. In Colombia trade loans are exempt from reserve requirements, but other types of regulations have been used to control this type of borrowing: minimum payment periods for imports of consumer and intermediate goods, and quantitative limits on the amount of export credit that is exempt from reserve requirements or eligible for a reduced reserve requirement.
The effectiveness of reserve requirements has been subject to a great deal of controversy.
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There is fairly broad agreement on their effectiveness as a liability policy. In this regard, although there are many other variables that influence the indicators shown in Figure 5 , they tend to confirm the observation that both countries have an above-average external debt profile. On the other hand, there are greater controversies about their effectiveness as a macroeconomic policy tool. Indeed, as indicated in the last section, neither country has been free from pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy patterns. However, judging from the solid evidence that exists with respect to the sensitivity of capital flows to interest rate spreads in both countries, reserve requirements do influence the volume of capital flows at given interest rates. This may reflect the fact that national firms' access to external funds actually is not independent of their maturities (in other words, the substitution effect between short-and long-term finance is imperfect), and that available mechanisms for evading or eluding these requirements are costly. 23 Alternatively, if higher reserve requirements induce new flows through their effect on interest rates, their ability to affect the latter should be seen as an indication that they are effective as a macroeconomic policy tool. In Colombia, where these regulations have been modified more extensively over the years, there is strong evidence that increases in reserve requirements have reduced flows 24 or, alternatively, have been effective in increasing domestic interest rates.
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Some problems in the management of these regulations have been associated with changes in the relevant policy parameters. The difficulties experienced in this connection by the two countries have differed. In Chile, the basic problem has been the variability of the rules pertaining to the exchange rate, since the upper and lower limits of the exchange rate bands (in pesos per dollar) were changed on numerous occasions until abandoned in 1998. During capital account booms, this gave rise to a "safe bet" for agents bringing in capital, since when the exchange rate neared the floor of the band, the probability that the floor would be adjusted downward was high. In Colombia, the main problem has been the frequency of the changes in reserve requirements. Changes foreseen by the market have sparked speculation, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of such measures for some time following the requirements' modification. It is interesting to note that in both countries reserve requirements have been seen as a complement to, rather than as a substitute for, other macroeconomic policies, which have been certainly superior in Chile. In particular, the expansionary and contractionary phases of monetary policy have been much more marked in Colombia, and this country's fiscal position deteriorated through the decade.
The three basic advantages of this regime are its preventive nature, its simplicity and its nondiscretionary character. Capital account regulations during booms, which have a preventive character, are certainly preferable to crisis-driven quantitative controls during crises. Indeed, such controls generate serious credibility issues and may be ineffective, as a tradition of regulation and supervision may be necessary to make them operative. Indeed, permanent regulation regimes that are tightened or loosened through the cycle are superior to the alternation of free capital mobility during booms and quantitative restrictions on outflows during crisises. However, simple quantitative restrictions that rule out certain forms of indebtedness (e.g., short-term foreign indebtedness, except trade credit lines) may also be simple and preventive in character, and may be simple to administer in underdeveloped regulatory regimes.
22
For documents which support the effectiveness of these regulations, see Agosin (1998) , Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1999), Le Fort and Budnevich (1997) , Le Fort and Lehman (2000) Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) , Ocampo and Tovar (1999) and Villar and Rincón (2000) . For an opposite view, see de Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) and Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) . There have also been explicit taxes on foreign-currency borrowing in other countries, notably Brazil. In Colombia, an attempt was made to set up this kind of system in early 1997, but the Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional.
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Some of these mechanisms, such as the use of hedging, enable investors to cover some of the effects of these regulations, but in large part by transferring risks (and, more specifically, the risk associated to long-term financing) to other agents. 24 Ocampo and Tovar (1999). These direct regulations on the capital account can be partly substituted by prudential regulation and supervision as an alternative to capital account regulations. In particular, higher liquidity (or reserve) requirements for the financial system's foreign-currency liabilities can be established. Also, the rating of domestic lending to firms with substantial foreign liabilities can be reduced and the provisions associated to such loans increased. The main problem with these options is that they have no effect on the foreign-currency liabilities of non-financial agents and indeed may encourage them to borrow more abroad. Accordingly, it needs to be supplemented with other disincentives for external borrowing by those firms, such as tax provisions applying to foreign-currency liabilities (e.g., allowing only partial deductions for interest payments abroad), public disclosure of the short-term external liabilities of firms and regulations requiring rating agencies to give special weight to this factor.
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Price-based capital account regulations may thus be a superior alternative and simpler to administer than an equivalent system based on prudential regulations plus additional policies aimed at non-financial firms. Among its virtues, vis-à-vis prudential regulation and supervision, we should also include the fact that it is price-based (some prudential regulations, such as prohibitions on certain types of operations, are not) and non-discretionary (on the contrary, prudential supervision tends to be discretionary in its operation). Indeed, equivalent practices are used by private agents, such as the selling fees imposed by mutual funds on investments held for a short period, in order to discourage short-term holdings.
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In the case of the public sector, direct control by the Ministry of Finance (in some cases by the central bank) is the most important liability policy, including control on borrowing by other public-sector agencies and autonomous sub-national governments.
28 Public sector debt profiles that lean too far towards short-term obligations may be manageable during booms, but may become a major destabilizing factor during crises. This remark is equally valid for external and for domestic public sector liabilities. The most straightforward reason for this is that residents holding short-term public sector securities have other options besides rolling over the public sector debt, including capital flight. This is even clearer if foreigners have access to domestic securities.
Thus, when gross borrowing requirements are high, the interest rate will have to rise in order to make debt rollovers attractive. Higher interest rates are also immediately reflected in the budget deficit, thereby rapidly changing the trend in the public-sector debt, as happened in Brazil during the recent crisis (see Figure 6 ). In addition, rollovers may be viable only if risks of devaluation or future interest rate hikes can be passed on to the government, generating additional sources of destabilization. Mexico's widely publicized move to replace in 1994 peso-denominated securities (Treasury Certificates or Cetes) by dollar-denominated bonds (Tesobonos), which was one of the crucial factors in the crisis that hit the country late in that year, was no doubt facilitated by the short-term profile of Cetes. 29 The short-term structure of Brazil's debt is also the reason why, since late 1997, fixed-interest bonds were swiftly replaced by variable-rate and dollar-denominated securities, which cancelled out the improvements that had been made in the public debt structure since the launching of the Real Plan. It is important to emphasize that, despite its fiscal deterioration, given her tradition of issuing public sector securities with a minimum maturity of one year, no substitution of similar magnitude was observed in Colombia during the recent crisis.
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For an analysis of this issue, see World Bank (1998), p. 151. See Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Ros (2000) .
Developing countries' anti-cyclical policies in a globalized world Thus, a sound maturity of the domestic public sector debt is an essential complement to a sound public and private external debt profile in terms of reducing the degree of vulnerability during crises. The improvements in Argentina's and Mexico's external debt profiles since the "Tequila" were generally regarded as a strength during the recent crisis. Similarly, Colombia's excellent external debt profile and the relatively sound maturity structure of its domestic public sector liabilities, in conjunction with its lower levels of indebtedness, were positively reflected in spreads during the recent crisis, despite its deteriorating fiscal position (the perception of significant "political risks" reversed, however, this situation in 2000).
The extent to which it will prove possible to issue longer-term domestic debt securities will depend on the depth of the local financial market, a characteristic that includes the existence of secondary debt markets to provide liquidity to those securities. For this reason, measures designed to deepen the countries' credit and capital markets play a crucial role in improving domestic debt profiles. This statement is also valid for an adequate development of long-term private capital markets. However, due to the lower risk levels and the greater homogeneity of the securities it issues, the central government has a vital function to perform in the development of longer-term primary and secondary markets for securities.
The development of such markets will not eliminate, however, the need for an active external liability policy, as deeper capital markets are also more attractive to volatile portfolio flows. Unfortunately, the tradeoffs are not simple in this regard, as external international portfolio flows may actually help to develop domestic capital markets. Thus, the authorities must choose between reduced volatility of external capital and the development of deeper, liquid domestic markets. The Chilean decision, to eliminate in May 2000, the one-year minimum maturity for portfolio flows, as well as the Colombian decision in 1996 to allow foreign investment funds to participate in the domestic market for public sector securities, may be understood as a choice for the second of these options at the cost of additional capital volatility. This is, in fact, what happened with portfolio flows in Colombia during the recent crisis.
V. Anti-cyclical prudential regulation and supervision
One of the painful lessons that has been learned during recent decades in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is just how costly financial crises are in terms of duration and cumulative loss of GDP.
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Some of the largest costs have to do with the sharp reduction in the time horizon of firms experiencing difficulties, which is also associated to the fact that ownership is partly indeterminate during crises (i.e., the proportion of assets which will be finally owned by stock holders vs. lenders may be subject to significant uncertainties). The losses are not only of a short term character, as they involve physical assets of firms as well as intangibles (including human and social capital and firms' business reputation, along with the consequent loss of business contacts) that have taken years to build up. Moreover, these losses are incurred even if the firm manages to restructure and survive. Also, the credit system is paralyzed for long periods, thereby slowing the recovery of economic activity. There are, however, some striking exceptions in this regard (Mexico's recovery from the "Tequila" crisis and the revival of the Chilean economy in the second half of the 1980s both took place against the backdrop of steeply falling levels of lending activity following severe financial crises).
The fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of bank rescues are also very high: 4 to 5% of GDP in relatively small crises, such as those of Colombia in the early 1980s and late 1990s; some 15% of GDP in severe ones, such as those that hit Mexico and Venezuela in the mid-30 IMF (1998), chapter 4. On the situation in Latin America, see also Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1996) . 1990s or South Korea in the late 1990s; and 35% of GDP or more in full-blown crises, such as those that engulfed Argentina and Chile in the early 1980s or Indonesia in the late 1990s. Thus, one of the best fiscal investments that a country can make is to avoid a financial crisis. This means that the private risks assumed by financial intermediaries during economic booms incorporate a substantial component of public sector risk. This fact constitutes a powerful argument for intervening in financial systems in order to prevent the build-up of excessive risks during booms.
The origins of problems that erupt during financial crises are well known. Generally, they are the result of a rapid increase in lending and weak prudential regulation and supervision, a combination that becomes explosive under conditions of financial liberalization in the midst of an external capital boom. The underestimation of risks characteristic of environments of economic optimism is then mixed with inadequate practices for evaluating risks, both by private agents and by supervisory agencies.
This underscores just how important the sequencing of financial liberalization processes is and, in particular, how necessary it is to make such liberalization contingent upon the prior establishment of appropriate prudential regulation and supervision and the design of satisfactory information systems to guarantee a proper microeconomic operation of markets. As the learning process -by financial intermediaries, depositors and the authorities-is not instantaneous, the liberalization process needs to be gradual to guarantee that financial intermediaries have the time they need to learn to manage higher risks, depositors to learn how to use the new information channels, and the authorities to learn how to supervise the system more strictly and how to modify prudential regulations and reporting requirements on the basis of accumulated experience.
Prudential regulation should ensure, first of all, the solvency of financial institutions by establishing appropriate capital adequacy ratios relative to the risk assumed by lending institutions, strict write-offs of questionable portfolios and adequate standards of risk diversification. In developing countries, the corresponding regulations should take into account not only microeconomic, but particularly macroeconomic risks they face. In particular, due attention needs to be paid to the links between domestic financial risks and variations in interest and exchange rates. Due to the greater financial volatility that characterizes these countries, capital standards should probably be higher than those proposed by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements. On the other hand, strict regulations should be established to prevent currency mismatches (including those associated with hedging and related operations), to reduce imbalances in the maturities of assets and liabilities of financial intermediaries and the timely write-off of due loans.
31 Prudential regulation should be particularly strict with respect to the intermediation of short-term external credits.
In addition, prudential regulation needs to ensure adequate levels of liquidity for financial intermediaries, so that they can handle the mismatch between average maturities of assets and liabilities associated to the financial system's essential function of "transforming maturities", which generates risks associated to volatility in deposits and/or interest rates. This underscores the fact that liquidity and solvency problems among financial intermediaries are far more interrelated than traditionally assumed, particularly in the face of macroeconomic shocks. Reserve requirements, which are strictly an instrument of monetary policy, provide the liquidity in many countries, but their declining importance makes it necessary to find new tools. What is more, their traditional structure is not geared to the specific objective of ensuring financial intermediaries' liquidity. The most important innovation on this area is undoubtedly the Argentine system created in 1995, which sets liquidity requirements based on the residual maturity of financial institutions'
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For an interesting analysis of the problems created by these mismatches and their effects during recent crises, see Perry and Lederman (1998). liabilities (i.e., the number of days remaining before reaching maturity).
32 These liquidity requirements -or a system of reserve requirements with similar characteristics-have the additional advantage that they offer a direct incentive to the financial system to maintain a better liability time structure.
Properly regulated and supervised financial systems are structurally superior in terms of risk management, generating incentives for financial intermediaries to avoid assuming unmanageable risks during booms. Nonetheless, they are incapable of internalizing all the collective risks assumed during such periods, which are essentially of a macroeconomic character and entail, therefore, coordination problems that exceed the possibilities of any one intermediary. Moreover, they have a pro-cyclical bias in the way they operate. In fact, it is during crises that, albeit with some delay, the excess of risk assumed during economic booms becomes evident. This ultimately makes it necessary to write-off loan portfolios -thereby reducing financial institutions' capital and, hence, their lending capacity. This, in conjunction with the greater subjectively perceived level of risk, is what triggers the "credit squeeze" that characterizes such periods. This is why instruments need to be designed that will introduce a countercyclical element into prudential regulation and supervision. In particular, they should be strengthened during periods of financial euphoria, to take into account the increasing risks in which financial intermediaries are incurring. Higher reserve requirements and restrictions on credit growth during boom periods can perform this function. Within the realm of regulatory mechanisms, higher capital adequacy ratios and stricter standards for debt classification and write-offs should be adopted. It may also be wise to raise liquidity requirements during these periods, especially for short-term liabilities. Deposit insurance rates could also be increased. Ceilings on the reference price for financial and real estate assets that are to be used as collateral for loans could be imposed (e.g., a provision under which no more than a specified, decreasing proportion of an asset's commercial value may be used for this purpose).
During financial crises, although authorities must adopt clearly defined rules to restore confidence, the application of stronger standards should be gradual, to avoid a credit squeeze. Of course, in order to avoid moral hazard problems, authorities must never bail out the owners of financial institutions, guaranteeing that their net worth is written off if the institutions are intervened.
It must be emphasized that prudential regulation and supervision have limits and costs that cannot be overlooked. Stricter standards in developing countries to manage macroeconomic risks increase the costs of financial intermediation, reducing international competitiveness and creating arbitrage incentives to use international financial intermediation as an alternative. Some classic objectives of prudential regulation, such as risk diversification, may be difficult to guarantee when macroeconomic issues are at the root of the difficulties. Moreover, as indicated, prudential regulation involves some non-price signals, and prudential supervision is full of information problems and is a discretionary activity susceptible to abuse, indicating that the faculties of the authorities must be subject to strict limits and controls. 
VI. Countercyclical fiscal management
Regardless of what exchange rate and capital account regime countries choose, fiscal policy provides always a useful anti-cyclical device. The importance of countering excess spending during booms became quite clear in Latin America during the debt crisis of the 1980s, as the over-expansion of externally-financed public expenditure during the preceding boom generated, in almost all countries, fiscal imbalances that ultimately proved to be untenable. The subsequent spending cuts greatly reduced the benefits of those public expenditures: investment projects were left unfinished or took much longer to execute than planned, thereby raising their effective cost; the existing structure for the provision of public and social services became disjointed; reductions in real wages and job cuts created tension and difficulties with trade unions and with public-sector employees in general; valuable staff were lost and the entire civil service was disrupted. The significant costs associated with these events continued to burden Latin American countries in the 1990s, owing to the difficulty of rebuilding the State apparatuses.
The painful lesson learned by Latin America during the debt crisis was thus that the lack of fiscal discipline during booms is extremely costly. A greater degree of fiscal discipline was thus maintained throughout the 1990s, though a moderate increase in budget deficits characterized the recent crisis, and some countries (Brazil and Colombia, in particular) have faced severe fiscal problems. Nonetheless, the return to a more orthodox policy stance has entailed the continued implementation of unmistakably pro-cyclical fiscal practices.
33 This is attributable to the tendency for public revenues to behave pro-cyclically -a characteristic that, far from having been mitigated, may have increased with structural reforms. 34 Under these conditions, setting fiscal targets independently of the business cycle implies that spending during booms is partly financed by temporary revenues. Given the inertia of current spending and pro-cyclical debt service patternsa reflection of pro-cyclical interest and exchange rates-sharp fluctuations in public sector investment may be required, generating the costs and inefficiencies mentioned earlier.
Other pro-cyclical rules are associated to explicit or implicit guarantees granted to the private sector. A case in question are the implicit guarantees of financial risks, which are reflected in the rescue packages for both domestic financial intermediaries and private firms with large external liabilities. A second case is public sector guarantees to private sector investments in infrastructure (such as minimum revenue or profit guarantees, or explicit coverage of exchange rate risks). Guarantees have three elements in common: (a) they are not always transparent; (b) they encourage private spending during booms; it is, thus, during periods of euphoria that implicit public sector spending in the form of an equivalent insurance premium is actually incurred, indicating that accrued public-sector spending during these periods is underestimated; however, (c) disbursements (cash spending) are incurred during crises, increasing borrowing requirements and crowding out other public sector spending. They thus encourage pro-cyclical private and public sector spending in non-transparent ways.
It is, therefore, necessary for authorities to set fiscal targets in terms of some sort of definition of the structural budget deficit. This means, first of all, that countries need to design mechanisms to sterilize temporary fiscal revenues. The experience gained from the use of stabilization funds for commodities with significant fiscal impact -the National Coffee Fund in Colombia (the first of its kind), the copper and petroleum stabilization funds set up in Chile and, more recently, the petroleum stabilization funds used by Colombia and Venezuela-must be extended to broader fiscal stabilization funds. Argentina created the first fund of this kind in 1999, but its operation will be delayed by the prior commitments to gradually reach a structural fiscal balance.
Well-designed social safety nets to protect vulnerable groups during crises (about which a broad-based consensus has emerged in recent international debates) is another useful alternative, particularly if mixed with funds to finance them that are accumulated during booms. An essential advantage of social safety nets is that spending is intrinsically counter-cyclical. On the contrary, anti-cyclical management of other spending may be inefficient. As indicated earlier, stop-go publicsector investment policies are inefficient. More broadly, an excessive reliance on anti-cyclical public sector spending policies -rather than a more balanced mix, which also relies on fiscal stabilization funds-may generate disequilibria between supplies of public and private goods during booms, with substantial distributive effects, as the recipients of goods and services provided by the public sector are not the same agents as those that benefit from private spending.
In any case, in order to avoid unsustainable trends in the public-sector debt, a countercyclical management of public finances during booms is essential in order to deal with crises. Setting annual target for the budget deficit without reference to the business cycle actually implies the existence of a narrow time horizon, a practice that reflects risk-aversion on the part of authorities, which may be justified by the painful history of fiscal destabilization in the past. This is 33 See CEPAL/ECLAC (1998b). 34 An important reason is the very higher short-term income elasticity of demand for imports. Since the tax component of imports (tariffs plus VAT) continues to be far in excess of the economy-wide average, and import-tax evasion is far below average, import volatility is reflected in tax revenues. why the development of suitable institutions for broadening that horizon, such as fiscal stabilization funds or properly designed social safety nets, is essential in order to preclude a return to the practices seen in the past.
These policies must be complemented with adequate mechanisms to manage public sector guarantees. With respect to financial risks, the liability and anti-cyclical regulatory policies analyzed in previous sections are the proper answer. In relation to other guarantees, it is necessary that the "insurance premium equivalent" of such guarantees be regularly estimated and budgeted, and the corresponding resources transferred to special funds created to serve as a backup in the event the corresponding contingencies become effective.
It should finally be emphasized that an anti-cyclical fiscal policy greatly facilitates a broad prudential regulation of booms. In particular, the counterpart of funds accumulated in fiscal stabilization funds should be increased accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and reduced currency appreciation. Such reserves also provide "self-insurance" against sharp cuts in foreign exchange availability and are the necessary counterpart to smoother fiscal adjustment during crises.
VII.Conclusions
Given existing asymmetries in the world economy, the volatility of capital flows generates strong pro-cyclical performance in the "business cycle/policy taking" periphery. An essential part of the solutions to this problem lies in strengthening the institutional framework to prevent and manage financial crises at the global level. This paper has analyzed, however, the room for domestic anti-cyclical policies in the developing world, which is a necessary counterpart of such international architecture.
The basic claim of the paper is that a mix based on managed exchange rate flexibility cum capital account regulations, strong "liability policies" to improve debt profiles, an anti-cyclical management of prudential regulation and supervision of domestic financial systems, and adequate anti-cyclical fiscal policies can provide some partial room for maneuver. All policies have, nonetheless, limited effects, given the more reduced degrees of freedom that authorities face in globalized markets. Thus, integrated strategies in which these different elements support each other in their anti-cyclical task are called for. The specific emphasis will vary depending on the macroeconomic constraints and traditions of each particular country. 
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